This paper proposes a model of optimal tax-induced transfer pricing with a fuzzy arm's length parameter. Fuzzy numbers provide a suitable structure for modelling the ambiguity that is intrinsic to the arm's length parameter. For the usual conditions regarding the antishifting mechanisms, the optimal transfer price becomes a maximising α-cut of the fuzzy arm's length parameter. Nonetheless, we show that it is profitable for firms to choose any maximising transfer price if the probability of tax audit is sufficiently low, even if the chosen price is considered a completely non-arm's length price by tax authorities. In this case, we derive the necessary and sufficient conditions to prevent this extreme shifting strategy.
Introduction
Tax literature frequently draws attention to the ambiguity between a tolerant tax avoidance behaviour vs. tax evasion. This ambiguity is especially relevant on the analysis of profit shifting strategies, where multinational enterprises -MNE carry intra-firm transactions between related parties from different jurisdictions, so to adjust the transfer prices in order to reallocate taxable profits from high-tax to low-tax locations 1 . Anti-shifting rules require that the transfer prices comply with the so called arm's length principle (OECD, 2017) , which states that intra-firm prices must be consistent with ones that would have been established with independent unrelated parties. If the arm's length condition is not satisfied, tax authorities require the payment of taxes over the shifted profits, and a tax penalty usually applies.
The arm's length condition is a fuzzy concept, since independent prices are influenced by legitimate differences in transactions' conditions (Becker, Davies, & Jakobs, 2017; Eden, 2001 ; * School of Economics, Business and Accounting at Ribeirão Preto, University of São Paulo, Brazil. E-mail: alex.rathke@usp.br 1 Existing studies provide relevant evidences of profit shifting by means of direct transfer pricing adjustments (Davies, Martin, Parenti, & Toubal, 2018; Cristea & Nguyen, 2016; Bernard, Jensen, & Schott, 2006; Overesch, 2006; Bartelsman & Beetsma, 2003; Clausing, 2003; Swenson, 2001) . OECD, 2017) . It means that transfer prices are not attained to a unique true arm's length price, but rather to a range of observable parameter prices with different degrees of appropriateness with respect to the arm's length condition. In the case of a tax audit, the tax authority has to assess if the transfer prices applied by the MNE satisfy the arm's length condition, or if the deviations from the core of the arm's length range represent evidences of profit shifting. This is no more than an ambiguous decision to be taken by the tax authority, thus it implies in additional uncertainties for the MNE.
This paper derives a model for optimal tax-induced transfer pricing subjected to a fuzzy arm's length parameter. We apply fuzzy numbers, which were first proposed by (Zadeh et al., 1965) and developed further by several researchers (Zimmermann, 1991; Klir & Yuan, 1995; Verdegay, 1982) , thus to model the impact of the uncertainty that is intrinsic to the arm's length parameter over the profit-maximisation strategy. Our model follows the concealment costs approach that is traditional in profit shifting literature (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972; Kant, 1988; Hines Jr & Rice, 1994) , however we design it in a generalised tax condition, which allows for the maximisation analysis without constraints on the shifting direction. The model takes the arm's length parameter as a fuzzy number, therefore the maximisation object is also a fuzzy object.
Baseline analysis shows that the solution of the fuzzy maximisation object under usual conditions is a α-cut of the fuzzy arm's length parameter, and any adjustments on the transfer price up to the optimal level provide a profit-shifting gain for the MNE. Nonetheless, we show that the MNE may completely disregard the arm's length parameter if the probability of tax audits is sufficiently low. It means that it is profitable to choose any maximising transfer price if the MNE has low chances of being audited, even if the maximising transfer price is considered a completely non-arm's length price. In this sense, we derive the necessary and sufficient conditions to prevent this extreme shifting case.
The remaining of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the basic notions of fuzzy sets and fuzzy numbers. Section 3 derives the general model. Section 4 solves the fuzzy maximisation object, presents the sensitivity analyses, and derives the impact of a general tax enforcement effect regarding the country-level anti-shifting variables. Section 5 draws some concluding comments.
Basics on Fuzzy Sets
Fuzzy sets were first introduced by seminal paper of (Zadeh et al., 1965) and generalise the classical notion of crisp sets. Fuzzy sets are a collection of elements in a universe where the boundary of the set is not clearly defined. The ambiguity associated with the bounds of the fuzzy setÃ in a universe X is represented by a membership function defined as µÃ(x) : R → [0, 1], x ∈ X, for µÃ(x) measures the grade of membership of element x inÃ. If the grade of membership is 0, then the element x does not belong toÃ. If the grade of membership is 1, then the element x completely belongs toÃ. If the grade of membership is within the interval [0, 1] , then the element x only partially belongs toÃ. The fuzzy setÃ is therefore characterised by the pair {(x, µÃ(x)) : x ∈ X}. Two fuzzy setsÃ andB are considered equal iff µÃ(x) = µB(x). LetÃ = {(x, µÃ(x)) : x ∈ X} be a fuzzy set and define a continuous interval α ∈ [0, 1]. The ordinary crisp set associated with any α ∈ [0, 1] is called α-cut of the fuzzy setÃ and is defined as A α = {x ∈ X : µÃ(x) ≥ α}. We can use α-cuts to represent intervals on fuzzy sets as
= min x {Ã}, max x {Ã} :Ã = {(X, µÃ(x)), µÃ(x) ≥ α}.
The sets A α , α ∈ [0, 1] refer to a decreasing succession of subsets continua; α 1 ≥ α 2 ⇔ A α 1 ⊆ A α 2 , α 1 , α 2 ∈ [0, 1] (Klir & Yuan, 1995) .
Theorem. (Representation Theorem - (Klir & Yuan, 1995; Zimmermann, 1991; Verdegay, 1982) 2 ) For a fuzzy setÃ and its α-cuts A α , α ∈ [0, 1], we havẽ
If the membership function µ Aα (x) is defined as the characteristic function of the set A α µ Aα (x) = 1, iff x ∈ A α 0, otherwise the membership function of the fuzzy setÃ can be expressed as the characteristic function of its α-cuts as
A fuzzy setÃ is convex iff its α-cuts are convex. Equivalently,Ã is convex iff ∀x 1 ,
A fuzzy number is a special case of a fuzzy set on the real line that is both convex and normalized. Its membership function is piecewise continuous and ∃x 0 ∈ R : µÃ(x 0 ) = 1 is called its mode. Since fuzzy sets are completely defined by their corresponding membership functions, we refer to a fuzzy number as the setÃ as well as the membership function µÃ(x) hereinafter.
For a sequence of real numbers x ∧ ≤x ∧ ≤x ∨ ≤ x ∨ ∈ R, the fuzzy numberÃ satisfies the following:
where [x ∧ ,x ∨ ] is the mode of the fuzzy number, [x ∧ ,x ∧ ] is the interval on the lower side of the mode with widthx ∧ − x ∧ , and [x ∨ , x ∨ ] is the interval on the upper side of the mode with width
A fuzzy numberÃ is of the LR-type if it can be parametrised by shape functions f ∧ (·) and f ∨ (·) on the lower and upper sides of the mode respectively 3 . A plane fuzzy number satisfies
its mode is a non-empty interval with more than one element (Klir & Yuan, 1995; Zimmermann, 1991) . A fuzzy number is called a trapezoidal fuzzy number iff it takes the form
A fuzzy number is called a triangular fuzzy number iff it takes the form 
The Model
In this section, we derive a model to analyse the optimal tax-induced transfer pricing. We first set the baseline net profit function for the MNE, then we derive the specification of the fuzzy profit shifting optimisation.
Baseline Profit Design
Consider a vertically integrated MNE with two divisions, the parent company located in Country 1 and a wholly owned subsidiary located in Country 2, i = {1, 2}. Both divisions 4 produce outputs x i under costs C i (x i ), bringing revenues R i (s i ) based on domestic sales s i (x i ). Parent firm also exports a portion m of its output to subsidiary in Country 2, regarding a single type of product, charging a transfer price p established by means of exclusive self-discretion of MNE's central management. We set m = m(s 2 ) and ∂m/∂s 2 > 0, thus intra-firm output m depends on the market demand for final product in Country 2. The pre-tax profits of both divisions are
Country 1 applies the source principle on taxation of foreign profits, and we assume no incremental operational cost on transferring internal output m to division 2, i.e.
Profit shifting incentives arise when tax rates between divisions are different, τ 1 = τ 2 , and total net profit Π(·) increases when MNE is able to choose a specific transfer price p so profits are transferred from the high-tax country to the low-tax country. The condition ∂Π(·)/∂p = (τ 2 − τ 1 )m implies the following two cases:
Low Transfer Price case -LTP:
High Transfer Price case -HTP:
In the LTP case, the MNE has incentives to shift profits from division 1 to division 2 by choosing a low transfer price p, thus harming tax revenues in Country 1. In the HTP case, MNE chooses a high price p so to shift profits to the opposite direction, thus harming Country 2.
Fuzzifying the Arm's Lenght Price
Assume that both countries impose a non-negligible and non-deductible tax penalty z i > 0 if profit shifting is detected, which is computed as a portion of the amount of evaded taxes. It means that the tax penalty z i is imposed if the harmed Country i observes that the transfer price p is different from a parameter pricep established under arm's length conditions 5 and this price gap results in the outflow of taxable profits from Country i. The parameter of an arm's length price is a fuzzy concept, since independent prices vary according to legitimate differences in transactions' conditions. Therefore, countries rather observe a fuzzy set of parameter pricesP , all of which have different degrees of appropriateness with respect to the arm's length principle 6 .
Define the fuzzy set of arm's length pricesP = {(p j , µP (p j )) : p j ∈ P }, j = i, P ∈ R + , where P is the universe of all observable independent prices, universe P is convex, and µP (p j ) is the membership function of the fuzzy setP . For a sequence of independent prices p ∧ ≤p ∧ ≤p ∨ ≤ p ∨ ∈ P , the fuzzy setP satisfies the usual conditions
The mode of the fuzzy setP satisfies ∀p j ∈ P : µP (p j ) = 1, which provides the interval of prices that completely satisfy the arm's length principle, µP Under these conditions, the fuzzy setP becomes a fuzzy number of the LR-type. CallP the fuzzy arm's length price. We define a standard membership function of the fuzzy numberP as follows:
with both functions f ∧ (·) and f ∧ (·) monotone continuous. In Eq. 5, we allow for the fuzzy arm's length priceP to be asymmetric. This asymmetry may be due to a difference in the widthsp ∧ − p ∧ and p ∨ −p ∨ on the lower and upper sides of the fuzzy numberP respectively, as well as for differences in grades of membership denoted by functions f ∧ (·) and f ∨ (·). In effect, the asymmetry in the fuzzy arm's length priceP is useful to describe how Countries 1 and 2 differ in their tolerance for a transfer price p farther from the parameter pricep.
5 The transfer pricing guidelines prepared by (OECD, 2017) have become the main criterion adopted by most countries worldwide for evaluation of intra-firm prices. The guidelines are built on the basis of the arm's length principle as the fundamentals for tax-compliant transfer pricing.
6 In this line, anti-shifting rules usually establish an arm's length range of appropriate transfer prices. The arm's length range is usually set as an interquartile range within the complete set of comparable prices (OECD, 2017) .
For the LTP case in Eq. 1, Country 1 is less tolerant with respect to a low transfer price close to p ∧ , while it accepts prices near or higher than the parameter pricep. Therefore, Country 1 is only concerned with the lower side f ∧ (·) of the fuzzy arm's length priceP . The opposite occurs for the HTP case in Eq. 1, since Country 2 is only concerned with the higher side f ∨ (·) ofP . If we divide the fuzzy arm's length priceP into two membership sections with respect to lower side f ∧ (·) and upper side f ∨ (·), we obtain two fuzzy numbersP ∧ andP ∨ satisfying the additional conditions:
It is clear that the fuzzy numbersP ∧ andP ∨ refer to the fuzzy arm's length prices taken into account by Countries 1 and 2 respectively 7 . We indicate the standard form of the fuzzy arm's length prices satisfying conditions in Eq. 6-8 asP c , c = {∧, ∨}. The mode of the fuzzy numbers P c satisfies the standard condition ∀p j ∈ P : µP c (p j ) = 1. The bound of the mode of the fuzzy numbersP c is defined in standard form 8 asp c . Hence, both profit shifting cases in Eq. 1 imply
Tax Audits and Tax Penalties
Both countries perform tax audits in order to prevent the profit shifting. In the universe of all taxpayers, we assume that countries are not able to continuously observe all MNE in absolute completeness, but they have to ex ante select which MNE are going to be audited. In special, both countries have no prior knowledge about the existence of intra-firm transactions pm, though this knowledge depends on an initial pick. Following (Levaggi & Menoncin, 2013) , we set the audit selection in Country i as a Poisson process with intensity rate λ i > 0 homogeneous through the total period determined in the legal statute of limitations. Rate λ i refers to the tax audit intensity in Country i. If the MNE is selected, Country i will observe pm, thus triggering a chance for tax penalty z i .
If the number of tax audits performed by Country i is q ∈ N, the probability of exact q = k tax audits is P(q = k, λ i ) = λ k i e −λ i /k!. Furthermore, the cumulative probability of Country i to perform up to k audits, P(0 ≤ q ≤ k, λ i ) is computed as
7 It is also clear that the fuzzy numbersP ∧ andP ∨ are of the L-type and R-type respectively. 8 The boundp c of the mode of the fuzzy numberP c can be defined as
where Γ(k) is the gamma function and Γ(k, λ) is the upper gamma function 9 . Remark that no penalisation will be imposed if there is no tax audit, q = 0. Moreover, even with an estimate of the number of tax audits E(q = k, λ i ) = λ i , the MNE can be selected under any number q different from k. In summary, MNE has a chance of being selected for tax audit if Country i performs at least one audit. Therefore, the total probability of tax audit for the MNE is
In the case of audit selection, Country i observes the intra-firm transactions pm and compares the transfer price p with the arm's length parameterp. If the harmed Country i concludes that the MNE is shifting taxable profits away, the MNE is required to pay the amount of evaded taxes plus a penalty z i levied over this amount. In this case, tax penalty is computed Nonetheless, the assessment of the transfer price p by Country i is based on the fuzzy arm's length parameterP c , c = {∧, ∨}. Formally, this assessment is made by taking the fuzzy number 
It means that the harmed Country i has the task to assess if the price gap ∆p is a tolerable variance under the fuzzy arm's length conditions or if it is an evidence of profit shifting.
Optimal Transfer Pricing
The MNE aims choose a transfer price p so to maximise global net profits Π(·), however it faces the chance of tax penalisation if the harmed Country i finds out the existence of intra-firm transactions pm and decides that it represents a profit shifting strategy. In this line, assuming that the optimal transfer price p * implies µP c (p * ) < 1, the MNE has a maximisation object specified as follows:
9 Derivation of Eq. 9 in Appendix. 10 Total tax penalty Zi(·) ≥ 0 is non-negative since the signs of both the tax differential τ2 − τ1 and the price gap p −p carry information about the shifting direction; HTP implies τ2
Since the expected tax penalty E(Z i (·)) is a fuzzy number, objective function in Eq. 12 becomes a fuzzy objective, and profit maximisation must take into account the fuzziness of the price gap ∆p = p −p c .
Conditions in Eq. 6-8 show that the standard-form fuzzy arm's length priceP c represents a one-to-one and onto correspondence µP c (p j ) : R → [0, 1] with respect to the closed interval of interest p j ∈ [p c ,p c ]. Therefore, we solve Eq. 12 by applying the procedure for fuzzy optimisation developed in the classical work of (Verdegay, 1982) .
From the representation theorem for fuzzy sets, Eq. 12 is expressed in the following parametric form:
is the inverse function of the membership function µP c (p j ). Simply stated, if the solution of Eq. 13 is p * (α), then the solution of Eq. 12 is the fuzzy set p * = {(p(α), α)}. Hence, profit maximisation in Eq. 12 resumes to find the optimal α-cut defined by
Based on the general Stone-Weierstrass approximation, assume that the standard-form shape function f c (·) in Eq. 5 can be defined as a simple power function
with γ i ∈ (0, 1] as a regularised parameter for the tolerance of Country i regarding fuzziness in the arm's length price, e.g. a slacken tax assessment by Country i implies γ i → 0, while a tighten tax assessment implies γ i → 1. Eq. 14 provides a smooth variation in membership grade as transfer price p gets farther from the bound of the modep c . For the interval of interest
Now we have the expected net profits E(Π(·)) specified completely in terms of the transfer price 11 p. Differentiating Eq. 15 with respect to p and solving, we obtain the solution
with | · | : R → R + as the absolute value function 12 . Eq. 16 shows that the optimal transfer price p * is represented as a maximising α-cut of the fuzzy arm's length priceP c defined as
e. the optimal price gap ∆p * = p * −p c is a share of the price difference p c −p c . This α-cut is represented by a share function over the interval [p c ,p c ], which is measured as the magnitude of the profit shifting incentive |τ 2 − τ 1 | adjusted by the marginal expected penalisation effect (1 − e −λ i ) · (1 + z i ) · τ i . The slope of this share is the same as of the shape function in Eq. 14 by means of the exponent γ i . It also has an adjustment equal to (γ i + 1)/γ i , which derives from the endogenous specification of the fuzzy arm's length priceP c in terms of p within the expected tax penalty in Eq. 15 13 . Moreover, the amount of intra-firm output m does not affect the optimal transfer price p * in the model, i.e. it refers 11 Parametric form in Eq. 15 is possible since the arm's length parameters p c ,p c ∈ P are exogenous with respect to Π(·) andZ(·).
12 The following property is applied: for any real number ∀x ∈ R, x satisfies
.
13 More specifically, the transfer price p affects both the transfer price gap ∆p = p −p c and the membership relation µP c (p) specified by the shape function in Eq. 14, for the combined marginal effect onZ(·) becomes (γi + 1)/γi. On the other hand, the transfer price p affects marginally the net profits Π(·) in a direct way. The to the application of the pure comparable uncontrolled price -CUP method 14 (OECD, 2017).
Sufficient joint conditions for non-zero optimal ∆p * are τ 1 = τ 2 , z i < ∞ and p c =p c .
Recall that the two profit shifting cases in Eq. 1 imply LTP → {i = 1, c = ∧}, HTP → {i = 2, c = ∨}. Total gains from profit shifting are obtained by substituting the optimal transfer price p * on the expected net profits E(Π(p * )) and comparing it with the net profits under the arm's length condition E(Π(p c )). We find
which is always positive for both LTP and HTP cases.
Proposition 1. Satisfying sufficient joint conditions for non-zero price gap, τ 1 = τ 2 , z i < ∞ and p c =p c , tax-induced variations in transfer prices always increase the expected net profits up to the optimal price gap
Proof. Expected net profits with respect to the optimal transfer price p * and to the bound of the mode of the arm's length conditionp c are equal to
total effect on the expected net profits is equal to
14 Literature indicates that profit shifting detection is more effective if tax audits focus on the amount of intrafirm transfers pm rather than on transfer prices only (Nielsen, Schindler, & Schjelderup, 2014) . Nonetheless, anti-shifting rules require the application of the arm's length principle solely for the establishment of transfer prices p, i.e. there are no current requirements for an "arm's length quantity" -say "m", and tax authorities bear no arguments against any intra-firm output m as long as the transfer price is equal to the arm's length price, p =p. Eq. 16 reflects this condition.
which is positive for both LTP and HTP cases derived in Eq. 1 as we have
We state a relevant condition for the audit intensity λ i > 0 derived from Eq. 16:
Proposition 2. The optimal transfer price p * is a α-cut of the fuzzy arm's length priceP c only if the audit intensity λ i satisfies the condition
Proof. For the optimal transfer price p * to be an optimal α-cut equal to P c =α = {p * ∈ P : µP c (p * ) = α}, specification in Eq. 16 requires the condition
which implies |∆p * | ≤ |p c −p c |. With respect to the domain of all variables within Eq. 16, we observe that the only case where the condition |∆p * | ≤ |p c −p c | is violated is when the audit intensity λ i is sufficiently small, such that
for some value δ 0 . The necessary condition |∆p * | ≤ |p c −p c | implies
If this condition is not satisfied, the optimal transfer price p * as specified in Eq. 16 outbounds
, thus the solution of Eq. 16 is no more a α-cut of the fuzzy arm's length priceP c .
Proposition 2 shows that the optimal transfer price as specified in Eq. 16 outbounds the interval of interest, p * / ∈ [p c ,p c ] if the audit intensity is sufficiently weak. In this special case, the MNE can further increase the gains from profit shifting by disregarding the bounds of the fuzzy arm's length priceP c when determining the transfer price p. It therefore implies:
Corollary 1. If the audit intensity λ i > 0 does not satisfy the condition in Proposition 2, maximisation object in Eq. 12 has no general solution in terms of an optimal transfer price p * .
Proof. Assume that the solution of Eq. 16 provides the inequality |∆p * | > |p c −p c |, so the condition in Proposition 2 is violated. Therefore, Eq. 5-8 imply that the optimal transfer price p * has a membership grade equal to zero, µP c (p * ) = 0, so p * is considered a completely non-arm's length price. In this case, it is clear that the initial maximisation object in Eq. 12 takes the form of a crisp linear function of p in the first place, with no constraints, which is equal to
with first derivative equal to
and second derivative equal to zero. The critical point at ∂E(Π(·))/∂p = 0 provides the same conditions as in Eq. 1, for we have
Therefore, any changes in the transfer price p towards the profit shifting direction increases the expected net profits with no upper bound, for both LTP ans HTP cases.
Corollary 1 simply shows that the MNE has full incentives to shift profits away from the high tax Country i if the tax authority is lax. For a sufficiently weak audit intensity λ i , the expected tax penalty becomes extremely low and linear with respect to the transfer price psee Proposition 2. In this case, it becomes profitable for the MNE to choose any tax-induced transfer price p, even if p is considered a completely non-arm's length price.
Sensitivity Analyses
Initially state the following:
Corollary 2. Under the optimality conditions regarding the price gap ∆p * , increase in intra-firm outputs m always increases the total amount of profit shifting.
Proof. Derives directly from the gains of profit shifting in Eq. 17
Marginal changes in intra-firm output m intensify the profit shifting amount, however intrafirm transfers depends on the product demand in Country 2, s 2 . Assume that the demand in division 2 is not changed, but the MNE has flexibility to vary the application of internal output m to provide revenues in division 2. Hence, the MNE can run a second optimisation stage to choose the optimal intra-firm output m. Differentiating the second-stage objective E(Π(p * )) with respect to intra-firm output m, subjected to the constraint m ≤ s 2 , we obtain In special, Eq. 18 indicates that different tax rates disturb the effect of the m-elasticity of substitution between costs C 1 (m) and C 2 (m) over the expected net profits E(Π(p, m)). The effect is equal to
, where ε C 1 ,C 2 is the m-elasticity of substitution 15 between C 1 (m) and C 2 (m).
With respect to the profit shifting incentive τ 2 − τ 1 , τ 1 = τ 2 , it is clear that the optimal transfer price p * is affected by changes in tax rate τ i ∈ [0, 1]. Differentiating Eq. 16 with respect to τ i , we obtain the following standard-form equations 16 :
First, Eq. 19 shows that the variation ∂p * /∂τ i follows the profit shifting direction.
Proposition 3. Variation in the optimal transfer price p * with respect to marginal changes in the tax rate τ i of the harmed Country i follows the direction of the profit shifting incentive τ 2 −τ 1 , such that sgn(∂p * /∂τ i ) = sgn(∆p * ). Variation ∂p * /∂τ i is equal zero iff τ j =i = 0.
Proof. From Eq. 19, the difference
positive. In this case, the following conditions are satisfied for each LTP and HTP cases:
For the limiting case where τ j =i = 0, Eq. 16 is no more a function of τ i , so we clearly have
As it is intuitively conjectured, Proposition 3 shows that marginal increments in the tax rate τ i of the harmed Country i widens the optimal price gap ∆p * thus to shift more profits away from Country i, since it represents an increase in the profit shifting incentive. Reductions in tax rate τ i cause the reverse effect. On the other hand, for marginal changes in tax rate τ j =i , i, j = {1, 2}
of the non-harmed Country j, variation ∂p * /∂τ j takes the opposite direction, e.g. a marginal increase in τ j =i shrinks the optimal price gap ∆p * and reduces the gains from profit shifting 17 .
15 Formally, the effect of the m-elasticity is equal to
where εpc,C 2 is the m-elasticity between the arm's length parameterp c and C2(m), and ε∆p * ,C 2 is the melasticity between ∆p * and C2(m). Eq. 16 implies both ∂p c /∂m = 0 → ∂p c /∂C2(m) = 0, ∂∆p * /∂m = 0 → ∂∆p * /∂C2(m) = 0, therefore we have εpc,C 2 = 0, ε∆p * ,C 2 = 0. 16 Derivation of Eq. 19-20 in Appendix. 17 For changes in τ j =i , i, j = {1, 2}, we have the condition
For the limiting case where the tax rate of the non-harmed Country j is zero, τ j =i = 0, changes in the tax rate τ i do not affect the optimal price gap ∆p * . The general condition for Eq. 19 to be linear occurs at the arm's length tolerance parameter equal to
with τ j =i = 0, where W (τ i , |τ 2 − τ 1 |) is the Lambert product log function 18 .
Furthermore, Eq. 20 describes the slope of changes in the optimal transfer price p * as the tax rate τ i changes. Under the scope of both LTP and HTP cases, Eq. 20 shows that the slope of the variation ∂p * /∂τ i is opposite to the profit shifting direction; the slope of ∂p * /∂τ i is strictly increasing for the LTP case and strictly decreasing for the HTP case.
Proposition 4. The slope of the variation ∂p * /∂τ i is opposite to the profit shifting direction, such that sgn(∂ 2 p * /∂τ 2 i ) = −sgn(∂p * /∂τ i ).
Proof. First, the multiplier at the right hand side of Eq. 20 equal to
is defined as the second-order τ i -semi-elasticity of the optimal transfer price p * , thus Eq. 20 is equal to Eq. 19 multiplied by ε 2
negative for both LTP and HTP cases. Proposition 3 shows that sgn(∂p * /∂τ i ) = sgn(∆p * ),
If τ i → τ j , i, j = {1, 2}, the tax differential tends to zero, τ 2 − τ 1 → 0, so Eq. 20 diverges for any γ i < 1 as follows:
The slope of ∂p * /∂τ i is equal to zero only in the special case where γ i = 1, τ i = τ j , i.e. it does not fit either LTP or HTP cases. Therefore, both LTP and HTP cases strictly satisfy the condition sgn(∂ 2 p * /∂τ 2 i ) = −sgn(∂p * /∂τ i ).
Eq. 20 shows that the variation ∂p * /∂τ i is elastic if the tax differential τ 2 −τ 1 is narrow, since it implies that the initial shifting incentive is weak and the maximising price gap ∆p * is rather
18 Lambert product log function is defined as the following: for an exponential function xe x , the inverse function is such as it satisfies the condition x = f −1 (xe x ) = W (xe x ), where W (x) is called the Lambert product log function. It is applied for a general power function
small -see Eq. 16. In this case, small marginal changes in τ i produce large marginal impacts on the optimal transfer price p * . On the other hand, a large profit shifting incentive τ 2 − τ 1 implies that the initial price gap ∆p * is already wide, and further marginal changes in the tax rate τ i produce a weaker impact. Variation ∂p * /∂τ i becomes inelastic as the tax rate approaches the
Corollary 3. Unitary τ i -elasticity of the optimal price gap ∆p * occurs at the equality
such that the arm's length tolerance parameter γ i scales the impact of the difference τ i − |τ 2 − τ 1 | within Eq. 19.
Proof. Derives directly from Eq. 16:
In overall, Eq. 19-20 show that the variation ∂p * /∂τ i converges if the general conditions
The general convergence at individually increasing tax rates τ i → 1, τ j =i → 1 are obtained as follows:
We also have lim γ i →0 ∂p * /∂τ i = 0. Nonetheless, in the limiting case of the tightest tax assessment γ i → 1, we obtain a special convergence for τ i → τ j equal to
, from which we obtain
Otherwise, variation ∂p * /∂τ i diverges as follows:
With respect to the other country-level variables related with the audit intensity λ i > 0, tax penalty z i > 0 and the arm's length tolerance parameter γ i ∈ (0, 1], specification of the optimal price gap ∆p * in Eq. 16 shows an elaborate effect. Variation of the optimal price gap ∆p * with respect to each individual country-level variable is equal to:
First regarding Eq. 21-22, both clearly present a negative effect on the optimal price gap ∆p * for the complete interval of interest p * ∈ [p c ,p c ], which is consistent with the intuitive premise, e.g. a marginal increase in the audit intensity λ i or in the penalty rate z i increases the expected tax penalty E(Z i (·)), thus it shortens the optimal price gap ∆p * ; a decrease in λ i or z i produces the opposite effect.
For the Eq. 23, on the other hand, the effect is not necessarily negative on the full interval
In the general case, the variation ∂p * /∂γ i represents a non-positive effect over the optimal transfer price p * iff it satisfies the inequality
otherwise, the effect follows the profit shifting direction. This positive effect is counter-intuitive at first, for we expect that changes in the arm's length tolerance parameter γ i ∈ (0, 1] to produce only effects that are opposite to the shifting incentive. Nonetheless, notice that the specification of the fuzzy arm's length priceP c in terms of p produces a marginal adjustment effect on the gains from profit shifting equal to 1/(1 + γ i ) -see Eq. 16. It means that the effect of marginal changes in the tolerance parameter γ i must be negative and must outburst the marginal effect of 1/(1 + γ i ), in order to produce a negative effect on p * . This last outcome 19 is specially due to the specification ofP c in terms of p within Eq. 15.
Modelling a General Tax Enforcement Effect
While Eq. 21-23 show how marginal changes in individual anti-shifting variables affect the optimal transfer price p * , the influence of a general enforcing behaviour from the harmed Country i may be reflected simultaneously in more than one variable. In special, it is safe to assume that the audit intensity λ i > 0 and the arm's length tolerance parameter γ i ∈ (0, 1] are both related 19 More specifically, marginal changes in the tolerance parameter γi produce a positive effect on p * iff Eq. 16 implies the inequality |τ2 − τ1| > (1 − e −λ i ) · (1 + zi) · τi · (1 + 1/γi). In this case, the optimal transfer price p * is increasing at γi, although it implies beforehand that p * is not a α-cut of the fuzzy arm's length priceP c -see
with some common measure of tax enforcement applied by Country i.
Letγ i ∈ (0, 1] be a regularised tax enforcement measure for the Country i, such that the arm's length tolerance parameter γ i is a monotone order-preserving function
for a weak tax enforcement impliesγ i → 0, while strong tax enforcement impliesγ i → 1.
Moreover, assume that the tax audit intensity λ i > 0 varies with respect to tax enforcementγ i , thus the audit intensity becomes a non-homogeneous Poisson rate function with respect to the tax enforcement, λ i (γ i ) : (0, 1] → R ++ . Assume that λ i (γ i ) is continuous. Hence, if the number of tax audits performed by Country i is q(γ i ) ∈ N and the tax enforcement levelγ i ∈ (0, 1] implies q(γ i ) ≥ 0, limγ i →0 q(γ i ) = 0, then the probability of exact q(γ i ) = k audits is
with the non-homogeneous Poisson intensity parameter equal to
Eq. 24 derives from the non-homogeneous Poisson condition
which says that the incremental probability of one additional tax audit by Country i is approximate to a linear relation between the rate function λ i (γ i ) atγ i and the variation in tax enforcement ∆γ i . The total probability of tax audit for the MNE derives directly from Eq. 10
and Eq. 24 and is equal to
Specification of the audit rate function λ i (γ i ) is not a straight task. In general, existing studies suggest that higher tax enforcement implies in more frequent audits, although the increments on the number of tax audits vary through the enforcement rangeγ i ∈ (0, 1] (Alm, 2012), so we assume that the audit rate is clearly non-decreasing as the tax enforcementγ i increases.
To simplify the analysis, define a general function f (γ i ) :
continuous for ∀γ i ∈ (0, 1), and it satisfies
conditions 20 regarding the audit rate function λ i (γ i ) and the tax enforcementγ i , we argue that the the audit probability can be parametrised with respect to the variableγ i as
so we are able to define the optimal transfer price in Eq. 16 in terms of the tax enforcement
20 Derivation of the conditions for Eq. 25 in Appendix.
From now on, simplify the notation of both general functions as g(γ i ) = gγ i and f (γ i ) = fγ i .
On the bounded domainγ i ∈ (0, 1], both functions gγ i , fγ i have the same limiting values on the boundaries,γ i → 0 andγ i → 1, which are equal to
by definition, regardless of their slopes. Since functions fγ i , gγ i are continuous on the complete domain, ∀γ i ∈ (0, 1], we observe that any monotonic map
Therefore, it implies the following:
Proposition 5. For the optimal transfer price p * (γ i , ·) parametrised with respect to the tax enforcement variableγ i ∈ (0, 1], the maximising prices at the boundaries of the domain,γ i → 0
Proof. For any marginal change in the tax enforcementγ i , variation in p * (γ i , ·) depends on the effect of both gγ i , fγ i , which is equal to [gγ i /(fγ i (1 + gγ i ))] gγ i . For the upper boundγ i → 1, we clearly have
For the lower boundγ i → 0, we derive the following:
ln liṁ
Since we also have the condition limγ i →0
= 1 with respect to the other countrylevel variables, we finally conclude that limγ i →0 p * (γ i , ·) =p c + 1(p c −p c ) = p c .
Proposition 5 confirms that the maximising transfer prices at the boundaries of the tax enforcement domain,γ i → 0 andγ i → 1 are both α-cuts of the fuzzy arm's length priceP c .
Nonetheless, for marginal changes within the domain intervalγ i ∈ (0, 1], the effect over the optimal transfer price p * (γ i , ·) depends on how functions gγ i , fγ i vary. Differentiating p * (γ i , ·) with respect toγ i , we obtain the following standard-form equations:
For Eq. 26, we observe again that the variation ∂p * (γ i , ·)/∂γ i is not necessarily negative for all ∀γ i ∈ (0, 1] -compare it with Eq. 23. A negative variation such that sgn(∂p * (γ i , ·)/∂γ i ) = −sgn(∆p * (γ i , ·)) requires the following necessary condition for the functions gγ i , fγ i :
Proposition 6. Variation in the optimal transfer price p * (γ i , ·) with respect to marginal changes in the tax enforcementγ i is opposite to the profit shifting incentive τ 2 −τ 1 , such that sgn(∂p * (γ i , ·)/∂γ i ) = −sgn(∆p * (γ i , ·)), iff the functions gγ i , fγ i satisfy the condition
Proof. For simplification, assume initially the equalities τ j =i = 0, z i = 0. For the Eq. 26 to have a negative effect, such that sgn(∂p
for the complete domain ∀γ i ∈ (0, 1]. Rearranging, we obtain the inequality
At the critical point ∂p * (γ i , ·)/∂γ i = 0, we clearly have
Now, for any small perturbation δ = 0 on function fγ i such that we have δ = 0 : fγ i = gγ i /(1 + gγ i ) + δ, the necessary condition is equal to
The inequality is satisfied for any non-negative value δ ≥ 0. On the other hand, if the perturbation is negative such that δ < 0 → fγ i < gγ i /(1 + gγ i ), we arrive at a contradictionthe right hand side of the inequality becomes the larger term. Hence, it implies
At last, this necessary condition is clearly maintained if we drop the simplifications τ j =i = 0, z i = 0; for both LTP and HTP cases, τ 1 = τ 2 , τ j =i > 0, z i > 0, we have the inequality
Proposition 5 shows that the optimal transfer price at the lowest enforcement level,γ i → 0 is equal to the least tolerable arm's length price p c , e.g. for the lowest tax enforcement, the MNE may choose the transfer price equal to p c ∈P c , which is the farthest from the modē p c . Moreover, Proposition 6 presents the necessary condition for the variation ∂p * (γ i , ·)/∂γ i to produce an effect opposite to the profit shifting incentive, τ 2 − τ 1 through the complete domaiṅ γ i ∈ (0, 1]. Hence, it implies the following: Corollary 4. Proposition 2 and Proposition 6 are equivalent.
Proof. Derives directly from Eq. 24 and Proposition 2, with the simplifications τ j =i = 0, z i = 0, for we have
From Corollary 4, it means that the inequality fγ i ≥ gγ i /(1+gγ i ) is also a necessary condition for the optimal transfer price p * (γ i , ·) to be a α-cut of the fuzzy arm's length priceP c . Otherwise, we may have a tax enforcement level such that ∃γ i ∈ (0, 1] :
Now, we derive a sufficient condition for the optimal transfer price p * (γ i , ·) to be a α-cut of the fuzzy arm's length priceP c for the complete domain ∀γ i ∈ (0, 1].
Proposition 7. If the functions gγ i , fγ i satisfy the condition fγ i ≥ gγ i for the complete domain ∀γ i ∈ (0, 1], the optimal transfer price p * (γ i , ·) is a α-cut of the fuzzy arm's length priceP c .
Proof. Corollary 4 derives the necessary condition fγ i ≥ gγ i /(1 + gγ i ) for the optimal transfer price p * (γ i , ·) to be a α-cut of the fuzzy arm's length priceP c with respect to the complete domain ∀γ i ∈ (0, 1]. First, we are sure that the necessary condition attains the equality at the lower bound of the domain,γ i → 0, for we have
But we also have that limγ i →0 gγ i /(1 + gγ i ) = limγ i →0 gγ i = 0, so all terms converge to zero at the very initial pointγ i → 0:
However, as the tax enforcement increases,γ i ∈ (0, 1] :γ i > 0, this equality is not maintained, since it impliesγ i > 0 → gγ i > gγ i /(1 + gγ i ). Besides, as the tax enforcement reaches the upper bound of the domain,γ i → 1, we have limγ i →1 gγ i = limγ i →1 fγ i = 1, thus it implies limγ i →1 fγ i > limγ i →1 (gγ i /(1 + gγ i )). Combining these two cases, we derive two possible inequalities:
It shows that if we have gγ i ≥ fγ i , we still need to confirm that the necessary condition
On the other hand, if we have fγ i ≥ gγ i , the necessary condition in Corollary 4 is automatically satisfied. Therefore, the condition ∀γ i ∈ (0, 1] : fγ i ≥ gγ i is a sufficient condition for the optimal transfer price p * (γ i , ·) is a α-cut of the fuzzy arm's length priceP c .
Remark that functions gγ i , fγ i refer to the arm's length tolerance parameter and the probability of tax audit respectively. Proposition 7 thus indicates that the optimal transfer price p * (γ i , ·) is certainly a α-cut of the fuzzy arm's length priceP c if the audit probability is greater than the arm's length tolerance parameter, for the complete domain ∀γ i ∈ (0, 1]. Otherwise, we still need to confirm that the necessary condition fγ i ≥ gγ i /(1 + gγ i ) is satisfied.
Discussion and Conclusion
This paper presents a model for optimal tax-induced transfer pricing under fuzzy arm's length parameter. The fuzzy arm's length price follows the structure of a fuzzy number (Zadeh et al., 1965 ) by means of a concave shape function with smooth membership grading, which varies with respect to the arm's length tolerance parameter of tax authorities. Under usual conditions, the optimal transfer price becomes a maximising α-cut of the fuzzy arm's length price, while it still satisfies the conventional assumptions of convex concealment costs and increasing profit-shifting incentives at an increasing tax differentials.
At first, we show that the MNE always obtains a gain from profit shifting up to the optimal transfer price, regardless of the shifting direction, and this gain is obtained at any levels of tax penalty, audit probability and arm's length tolerance. Gains from profit shifting are intensified by adjusting the intra-firm outputs at a second maximisation stage. Moreover, the MNE may obtain exceeding gains by extrapolating the fuzzy arm's length parameter if the probability of tax audits is sufficiently low. This extreme case is prevented specially by increasing the audit intensity or intensifying the other anti-shifting mechanisms on the harmed country.
These analyses offer some interesting insights on how the ambiguity of the arm's length parameter may affect the profit shifting strategy of firms. First and foremost, the fuzziness of the arm's length parameter can be used by firms to achieve their profit shifting goals, since this fuzziness is the condition that implies the gains from profit shifting. For any questioning by the tax authority, the transfer price may be more or less sustained based on arguments about the conditions of the comparable transactions. Moreover, even if the tax authority observes all intra-firm transactions in a full-audit mode, the ambiguity of what can considered an appropriate transfer price is not eliminated. It means that the uncertainty is not attributed only to the probability of being audited, but also on the tolerance level of the tax auditor. And this uncertainty can be beneficial for firms focusing on a profit shifting strategy. At last, anti-shifting rules impose the arm's length criterion for the transfer prices, but no requirements are currently imposed for the level of internal outputs. In this sense, any change in the arm's length tolerance of tax authorities might be offset by adjustments in internal outputs if the MNE has some operational flexibility, so the final amount of shifted profits remains the same.
Appendix
Derivation of Eq. 9
For a variable g ∈ R ++ as any point within a continuum of occurrences at a constant average rate λ, the time y of the g-th occurrence is a random variable that follows a gamma distribution and has a cumulative probability as P(y) = 1 − Γ(g, λ)/Γ(g). The gamma function is defined as
and the upper gamma function is defined as
Since we have discrete events as g = k : k ∈ N, the upper gamma function can be expressed as the series expansion
The second multiplier at the right hand side of the above equation represents the cumulative chance of k − 1 events to occur at intensity λ up to moment y, where k is a Poisson random variable 21 . In addition, the gamma function satisfy the property Γ(k) = (k − 1)! for discrete variables k ∈ N, which implies the equality kΓ(k) = Γ(k + 1). Hence, assuming the occurrence rate λ is obtained for a period up to y, thus y = 1, these conditions allow us to derive the cumulative probability distribution of k events as
which is presented in Equation 9. Poisson cumulative distribution function k q=0 P(q) expressed by means of gamma function Γ(k, λ) is defined for all positive real numbers and provides continuity condition for the analysis.
Derivation of Eq. 19-20
For all real numbers ∀x ∈ R, x is equal to x = sgn(x) · |x|, with | · | : R → R + as the absolute Under these properties, differentiating Eq. 16 with respect to τ i provides the following standard form:
21 The relation P(y) = 1 − P(k − 1) indicates that changes in occurrence rate λ produce an inverse impact on the distribution; a random gamma-distributed variable y has mean E(y) = k/λ and variance V(y) = k/λ 2 . 
Derivation of Eq. 25
The homogeneous audit intensity λ i > 0 can be any positive real number, thus the range of the corresponding non-homogeneous audit rate function λ i (γ i ) : (0, 1] → R ++ is unbounded above.
Since we have a bounded domainγ i ∈ (0, 1], therefore the rate function λ i (γ i ) must indeed be 
Integrating on the full domainγ i ∈ (0, 1], we obtain a parametric representation of the audit intensity Λ i (0,γ i ) in terms of f (γ i ) equal to 22 Of course, the condition for the function λi(γi) to be unbounded above necessarily arises from our restriction of the domain ofγi to the bounded interval (0, 1].
23 For a differentiable function f (y) : Y → R, y ∈ Y , Y is bounded, the negative semi-elasticity equal to
is unbounded above at the zeros f (y) → 0. Two classical examples are the functions −1/y and tan(y), which are unbounded above on the bounded domains y ∈ [−1, 0] and y ∈ [0, π/2] respectively. Both examples are defined as the negative semi-elasticities of the functions f (y) = −y and f (y) = cos(y) as follows: which satisfies the unboundedness condition. Therefore, the total probability of tax audit becomes P(q(γ i ) > 0, λ i (γ i )) = 1 − e −Λ i (0,γ i ) = 1 − e ln(1−f (γ i )) = f (γ i ).
Derivation of Eq. 26
To simplify the analysis, we adopt in this section the prime notation for the first and second derivatives as follows: for the differentiable function f (γ i ) = fγ i , the first and second derivatives regarding the variableγ i are respectively equal to dfγ i /dγ i = f γ i , d 2 fγ i /dγ i 2 = f γ i .
Differentiating the optimal transfer price p * (γ i , ·) with respect to the variableγ i as parametrisation in Section 4.2, we obtain the following standard form: 
